





Necessary “Procedures”:  
Making Sense of the Medicare Act’s  
Notice-and-Comment Requirement 
Josh Armstrong† 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Azar v Allina Health Services, Inc 
opened and then declined to resolve a new question of administrative law. In that 
case, the Court affirmed the DC Circuit’s holding that the Medicare Act, unlike the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), did not exempt so-called “interpretive rules” 
from notice and comment. Crucially, however, the Supreme Court declined to give 
any further guidance as to what rules the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment pro-
vision does cover. This lack of guidance added further confusion to an already-
murky area of law: the DC Circuit’s current interpretation of the Medicare statute, 
which is the only one presently left standing, has no fixed limits and is tethered only 
to a dictionary definition. This Comment argues that courts should clarify the reach 
of the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment provision by looking to existing case law 
interpreting the APA’s exemption to notice and comment for procedural rules. This 
reading would provide the administrators of the Medicare system with much-needed 
guidance as to which rules they must subject to notice and comment. With the effec-
tive administration of over sixty million Americans’ health insurance on the line, 
clarifying the statute’s notice-and-comment requirement is a necessary “procedure.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no problem has caused more consternation and out-
right confusion in administrative law circles than the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act’s1 (APA) exemptions to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, the process by which agencies present proposed rules 
to the public for feedback before issuing them in final form. In 
particular, the exemption for “interpretative rules,”2 a term the 
statute does not define, has spawned a multitude of conflicting 
tests in the courts and various proposed solutions in the scholarly 
literature.3 All the while, in more than half a century since the 
 
 1 Pub L No 89-554, 80 Stat 378 (1966), codified in various sections of Title V. 
 2 5 USC § 553(b)(A). Courts and scholars use the words “interpretative” and “inter-
pretive” interchangeably. 
 3 See, for example, Nadav D. Ben Zur, Note, Differentiating Legislative from Nonleg-
islative Rules: An Empirical and Qualitative Analysis, 87 Fordham L Rev 2125, 2144–48, 
2165 (2019); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U Chi L Rev 1705, 1708–09, 
1718–21 (2007); Richard J. Pierce Jr, Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative 
Rules, 52 Admin L Rev 547, 566 (2000); Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” 
Rules and Spurious Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 Admin L J Am U 1, 15–17 (1994). 
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APA’s enactment, the Supreme Court has never explained in de-
tail what qualifies as an interpretive rule.4 
In 2019, the Court heard Azar v Allina Health Services5 (Al-
lina II), a case which administrative law scholars hoped would 
offer a shred of guidance concerning interpretive rules—but they 
were disappointed. In that case, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services6 (CMS), which administers the Medicare pro-
gram, had decided without notice and comment to adjust the cal-
culations for deciding how much reimbursement hospitals would 
receive for treating a “disproportionate share” of low-income pa-
tients.7 The plaintiffs’ challenge turned not on the APA’s notice-
and-comment provision, but on a similar provision in the Medi-
care Act8 requiring notice and comment for any Medicare rule cre-
ating or changing a “substantive legal standard.”9 The DC Circuit 
had broken with every other circuit to hold that this provision in 
the Medicare Act did not incorporate the APA’s exemption for in-
terpretive rules.10 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
DC Circuit that the phrase “substantive legal standard” in the 
Medicare Act did not exempt interpretive rules, thereby rejecting 
the position of the majority of circuit courts.11 But the Court also 
created a new, unresolved question of law by refusing to explain 
 
 4 See Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1204 (2015) (declining 
to “wade into that debate” over the “precise meaning” of “interpretative rule”).  
 5 139 S Ct 1804 (2019). 
 6 CMS is an agency under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
the secretary of which was the nominal plaintiff in the Allina II case. Courts sometimes 
refer to CMS by name, see, for example, Select Specialty Hospital-Denver, Inc v Azar, 391 
F Supp 3d 53, 62 (DDC 2019), and sometimes refer to it simply as “the agency,” see, for 
example, Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1809–10. In certain factual scenarios, courts may also refer 
to “the Secretary.” See Clarian Health West, LLC v Hargan, 878 F3d 346, 352 (DC Cir 
2017) (Clarian II). This is because the secretary of HHS, at least formally, has some per-
sonal involvement in certain aspects of the Medicare scheme, including the issuance of 
final rules and the final disposition of reimbursement appeals. See 42 USC 
§§ 1395hh(a)(1), 1395oo(f). In general, this Comment refers to CMS by name, even where 
formal authority rests with the HHS secretary. 
 7 See Allina Health Services v Price, 863 F3d 937, 938–42 (DC Cir 2017) (Allina I), 
citing 42 USC § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I). 
 8 Pub L No 89-97, 79 Stat 286 (1965), codified at 42 USC § 1395 et seq. 
 9 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 10 See Allina I, 863 F3d 937 at 943. See also Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1810 (noting that 
when “the court of appeals sided with the hospitals” in Allina I, it “created a conflict with 
other circuits”). 
 11 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1814. 
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exactly what that phrase did cover and by expressing no opinion 
on the particulars of the DC Circuit’s interpretation.12 
The disappointment of those who are kept up at night pon-
dering the meaning of a few words in the APA is not the gravest 
consequence of the Allina II decision.13 Far more troubling is the 
uncertainty facing the Medicare system, the country’s second-
largest domestic spending program, which provides health insur-
ance to over sixty million Americans at a cost of over $700 billion 
per year.14 The DC Circuit’s interpretation of the phrase “substan-
tive legal standard” in the Medicare Act was pulled directly from 
Black’s Law Dictionary and is noncommittal at best: “A ‘substan-
tive legal standard’ at a minimum includes a standard that ‘cre-
ates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of par-
ties.’”15 And the Supreme Court expressly declined to say whether 
this interpretation was correct. Suddenly, CMS has no nationally 
binding guidance (and somewhat uncertain guidance in the DC 
Circuit) as to which policies it must subject to notice and comment. 
CMS could benefit greatly from a clear statement specifying 
what notice-and-comment standard it will be held to under the 
Medicare Act. Certainty on that front could lead to more effective 
administration of the Medicare system for its millions of benefi-
ciaries. To that end, this Comment prescribes a “procedure” to 
cure the uncertainty: Instead of attempting to divine the distinc-
tion between substance and procedure from a dictionary defini-
tion, courts hearing notice-and-comment challenges to Medicare 
rules should look to existing doctrine. Specifically, courts should 
focus on the case law concerning the APA’s other notice-and-
comment exemption for “rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice.”16 This interpretation would presumably be permissi-
ble under current precedent, as Allina II never expressly rules 
out the possibility that the Medicare statute in effect borrows that 
exemption. 
 
 12 See id (“We need not, however, go so far as to say that the hospitals’ interpretation, 
adopted by the court of appeals, is correct in every particular. . . . Other questions about 
the statute’s meaning can await other cases.”). 
 13 I say this as someone who has spent many a sleepless night pondering the meaning 
of a few words in the Medicare Act. 
 14 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1808. 
 15 Allina I, 863 F3d at 943 (emphasis added), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (West 
10th ed 2014). 
 16 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
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Part I explains the statutory and precedential background 
leading up to the Allina case, the case itself, and subsequent de-
velopments. Part II develops what I term the “reconciled proce-
dural reading” and argues that the Medicare Act’s notice-and-
comment provision is most naturally read as the mirror image of 
the APA’s exemption to notice and comment for “rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice.”17 Part III applies the pre-
vailing test for that exemption to the facts of existing Medicare 
cases involving notice-and-comment challenges to illustrate how 
the test would work in application. Part IV argues that the recon-
ciled procedural reading is better suited than the DC Circuit’s 
current approach to addressing the policy concerns that both Al-
lina decisions left unresolved, and then responds to counterargu-
ments. Given the blows CMS suffered in both Allina decisions, I 
conclude that fixing the limits of the Medicare Act’s notice-and-
comment provision isn’t just a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion—it’s medically necessary. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Understanding the questions left open by both Allina deci-
sions “requires a tour of the ‘labyrinthine world of Medicare reim-
bursements’”18 and of notice and comment more generally. This 
Part explains the statutory bases for notice-and-comment rule-
making under the APA and the Medicare Act, as well as the rele-
vant case law interpreting both statutes’ notice-and-comment 
provisions. 
A. The APA and Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
Under the APA, an agency seeking to adopt a new adminis-
trative rule ordinarily must first give notice of the proposed rule 
and subject it to a period of public comment.19 This procedure im-
parts important benefits in terms of the rule’s efficacy, respect for 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 Community Health Systems, Inc v Burwell, 113 F Supp 3d 197, 202 (DDC 2015), 
quoting District Hospital Partners, LP v Burwell, 786 F3d 46, 48 (DC Cir 2015). See also 
Rehabilitation Association of Virginia, Inc v Kozlowski, 42 F3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir 1994) 
(“There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions . . . involving the financing of 
Medicare and Medicaid[ ] are among the most completely impenetrable texts within hu-
man experience.”). 
 19 See 5 USC § 553. 
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the regulated public’s settled expectations, and public accounta-
bility for the administrative state.20 The APA makes exceptions to 
its notice-and-comment requirement, however, for “interpretative 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice,”21 as well as when there is “good 
cause” to deviate from notice-and-comment procedures.22 When 
an agency makes a rule that does not fall under one of the stat-
ute’s exemptions without notice and comment, it risks a court 
holding the rule procedurally invalid and therefore not binding on 
parties. 
A complicated taxonomy has evolved to describe different 
types of rules which are or are not subject to the APA’s notice-
and-comment requirement. Courts often refer to any rule which 
is subject to notice and comment as a “substantive” rule, as op-
posed to an “interpretive” or “procedural” rule, but this practice 
obscures what are actually two distinctions. The first is between 
“interpretative rules” and “general statements of policy” on the 
one hand (sometimes collectively referred to as “nonlegislative 
rules”),23 and what scholars generally call “legislative rules” on 
the other.24 The second is between “substantive” and “procedural” 
 
 20 As Professor Richard J. Pierce puts it: 
The APA rulemaking procedure has many advantages. It enhances the quality 
of rules by allowing the agency to obtain a better understanding of a proposed 
rule’s potential effects in various circumstances and by allowing the agency to 
consider alternative rules that might be more effective in furthering the agency’s 
goals or that might have fewer unintended adverse effects. Second, it enhances 
fairness by providing all potentially affected members of the public an oppor-
tunity to participate in the process of shaping the rules that will govern their 
conduct or protect their interests. Finally, it enhances political accountability by 
providing the President and members of Congress a better opportunity to influ-
ence the rules that agencies issue. 
Pierce, 52 Admin L Rev at 550 (cited in note 3) (citations omitted). 
 21 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 22 5 USC § 553(b)(B). 
 23 There is also a distinction between “interpretative rules” and “general statements 
of policy,” 5 USC § 553(b)(A), but courts often speak of these categories in the same breath. 
Indeed, the Allina II Court treats the interpretive rule and policy statement exemptions 
as one. See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1813 (“If, as the government supposes, Congress had also 
wanted to borrow the other APA exemption, for interpretive rules and policy statements, 
it could have easily cross-referenced that exemption in exactly the same way.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 24 See Gersen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 1708–09 (cited in note 3) (discussing various terms 
used in the literature to distinguish between “legislative” and “nonlegislative” rules). 
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rules.25 To avoid conflating the two distinctions, this Comment 
uses the term “legislative” only as the opposite of “interpretive” 
and “substantive” only as the opposite of “procedural.”26 The fol-
lowing sections describe how courts have attempted to draw the 
lines as to each of these distinctions, with the DC Circuit’s ap-
proach predominating in each.27 
1. Legislative versus interpretive rules. 
The distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is 
a notoriously intractable question of administrative law. It has 
become a cliché in scholarship to refer to a “considerable smog” 
clouding this distinction.28 For over half a century, the Supreme 
Court has refused to offer detailed guidance as to what makes a 
rule interpretive within the meaning of the APA. Recently, in Perez 
v Mortgage Bankers Association,29 the Court insisted that it “need 
not, and [would] not, wade into [the interpretive rule] debate 
here.”30 Instead, the Court maintained, “It suffices to say that the 
critical feature of interpretive rules is that they are ‘issued by an 
agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the 
statutes and rules which it administers.’”31 
The lower courts have thus been left to define the line be-
tween legislative and interpretive rules on their own—a task 
which has proved challenging, to say the least. Since this distinc-
tion determines whether an agency must put a new rule through 
the costly notice-and-comment process before issuing it, indeter-
minacy in line drawing has very real consequences. 
 
 25 See, for example, Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1811 (describing the plaintiffs’ contention 
that 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2) was intended to distinguish between substantive and proce-
dural rules, not substantive and interpretive rules). 
 26 “Interpretive” and “procedural” are each sufficient (but not individually neces-
sary) conditions to exempt a rule from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. 5 USC 
§ 553(b)(A). Only rules which are both legislative and substantive must undergo notice 
and comment under the APA. 
 27 The DC Circuit is widely considered to be the most influential court of appeals on 
matters of administrative law, largely due to its geographic jurisdiction over the seats of 
most federal agencies and, as a result, its comparatively larger administrative law docket. 
See generally Arthur E. Bonfield, The Contribution of the DC Circuit to Administrative 
Law, 40 Admin L Rev 507 (1988). 
 28 See, for example, Anthony, 8 Admin L J Am U at 4 (cited in note 3) (“It helps no 
one for the courts repetitiously to incant clichés about how the distinctions are ‘fuzzy’ or 
‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’”) (citations omitted). 
 29 135 S Ct 1199 (2015). 
 30 Id at 1204. 
 31 Id, quoting Shalala v Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 US 87, 99 (1995). 
2182 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:2029 
 
The most cited case on the distinction between legislative and 
interpretive rules is the DC Circuit’s opinion in American Mining 
Congress v Mining Safety & Health Administration,32 holding that 
the relevant question is: 
[W]hether the purported interpretive rule has “legal effect,” 
which in turn is best ascertained by asking (1) whether in the 
absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative 
basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer 
benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the 
agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its gen-
eral legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively 
amends a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any of these 
questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an inter-
pretive rule.33 
This four-part test won much adoration in the academy after its 
announcement,34 but its effect in clearing the smog was limited. 
While other courts have cited American Mining Congress with ap-
proval, few have applied it mechanically, and many have supple-
mented it in ways that have further confused the doctrine.35 Even 
the DC Circuit altered the test in subsequent decisions, first 
downplaying the Code of Federal Regulations factor36 and then 
changing the fourth factor (whether a rule amends a prior legis-
lative rule) to ask whether the rule amends a prior interpretive 
rule (a factor the Supreme Court has since rejected).37 The current 
 
 32 995 F2d 1106 (DC Cir 1993). 
 33 Id at 1112. 
 34 See Pierce, 52 Admin L Rev at 561 (cited in note 3) (describing how the American 
Mining Congress test “was widely praised in casebooks, treatises, and hornbooks”). 
 35 See id at 548 n 16 (collecting cases). 
 36 See Health Insurance Association of America, Inc v Shalala, 23 F3d 412, 423 (DC 
Cir 1994) (noting that “[i]n none of the cases citing the distinction [between legislative and 
interpretive rules] . . . has the court taken publication in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
or its absence, as anything more than a snippet of evidence of agency intent”). 
 37 See Paralyzed Veterans of America v DC Arena, 117 F3d 579, 586–87 (DC Cir 
1997), abrogated, Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct at 1206. The Court in Mortgage 
Bankers Association rejected the DC Circuit’s new formulation of the factor because it 
found no textual support in the APA for the proposition that changing a prior interpretive 
rule requires notice and comment. Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct at 1206. It did 
not rule out the possibility that changing a prior legislative rule requires notice and com-
ment. Id at 1210. 
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state of the doctrine is not so much a competition between defini-
tive tests as a sea of different factors that courts mix and match 
selectively to differentiate legislative from interpretive rules.38 
2. Substantive versus procedural rules. 
The APA also exempts “rules of agency organization, proce-
dure, or practice” from notice-and-comment rulemaking.39 Again, 
the Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to what con-
stitutes a procedural rule, except to imply that a rule being con-
fined to mere “housekeeping” measures is a sufficient condition 
for falling under that exemption.40 The APA’s procedural rule ex-
emption seems to be litigated less often than its interpretive rule 
exemption, leading to somewhat underdeveloped case law in some 
circuits and even conflation of interpretive and procedural rules.41 
While the circuits have yet to coalesce around a single approach 
to the procedural rule exemption, the tests currently in use are at 
least simpler than those for the interpretive rule exemption. The 
DC Circuit and the Fifth Circuit offer the two clearest alternative 
approaches to identifying procedural rules under the APA. 
While the DC Circuit has not used precisely the same lan-
guage in every case, it staked out its basic position regarding the 
procedural rule exemption—what I call the “substantive-value-
judgment test”—in American Hospital Association v Bowen.42 Un-
der American Hospital Association, a rule is not substantive 
simply because of its practical effect on regulated parties; it must 
“also encode[ ] a substantive value judgment or put[ ] a stamp of 
approval or disapproval on a given type of behavior.”43 In other 
words, the DC Circuit looks not only to a rule’s impact, but also 
to its underlying purpose, “reflect[ing] a candid recognition that 
even unambiguously procedural measures affect parties to some 
 
 38 For analysis of these different factors and of their relative popularity and effect on 
outcomes, see generally Ben Zur, 87 Fordham L Rev 2125 (cited in note 3). Since the Su-
preme Court has held that the Medicare Act does not exempt interpretive rules from notice 
and comment, see Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1814, this Comment forgoes any further attempt 
to make sense of the doctrine surrounding that exemption. 
 39 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 40 See Chrysler Corp v Brown, 441 US 281, 311–12 (1979). 
 41 See, for example, Chao v Rothermel, 327 F3d 223, 227 (3d Cir 2003) (“Interpretive, 
or ‘procedural,’ rules do not themselves shift the rights or interests of the parties, although 
they may change the way in which the parties present themselves to the agency.”) (em-
phasis added). 
 42 834 F2d 1037 (DC Cir 1987). 
 43 Id at 1047. 
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degree.”44 The DC Circuit further elaborated this nuanced ap-
proach in the now-vacated case of Air Transport Association of 
America v Department of Transportation,45 emphasizing the im-
portance of the language Congress chose: “In using the terms 
‘rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice,’ Congress in-
tended to distinguish not between rules affecting different classes 
of rights—‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’—but rather to distin-
guish between rules affecting different subject matters—‘the 
rights or interests of regulated’ parties, . . . and agencies’ ‘internal 
operations.’”46 
While Air Transport’s precedential value is now uncertain,47 
it illustrates how the substantive-value-judgment test first an-
nounced in American Hospital Association looks beyond a rule’s 
practical effect on regulated parties. Roughly speaking, the DC 
Circuit’s procedural rule test differentiates between rules that 
deal primarily with the behavior of the regulated public (substan-
tive rules) and those that deal primarily with the internal work-
ings of the agency (procedural rules), regardless of incidental im-
pacts on regulated parties. 
The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, applies a blunter instrument 
to distinguish substantive from procedural rules: the substantial-
impact test.48 Under that test, any “agency rule that modifies sub-
stantive rights and interests can only be nominally procedural,” 
and therefore must undergo notice and comment.49 This approach 
may seem to follow intuitively from the distinction between sub-
stance and procedure, but it has proven controversial. Other cir-
cuits have rejected the substantial-impact test out of concern that 
it jettisons the text of the procedural rule exemption altogether 
and swallows up a number of rules Congress did not intend to 
subject to notice and comment.50 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 900 F2d 369 (DC Cir 1990), vacd as moot, 933 F2d 1043 (DC Cir 1991). 
 46 Id at 378 (emphasis in original), quoting American Hospital Association, 834 F2d 
at 1041, 1047. 
 47 For discussion of Air Transport and the extent to which it is still good law, see 
notes 172–75 and accompanying text; note 181. 
 48 See Texas v United States, 787 F3d 733, 765–66 (5th Cir 2015) (endorsing the sub-
stantial-impact test as “the primary means . . . [to] look beyond the label ‘procedural’ to 
determine whether the rule is of the type Congress thought appropriate for public partic-
ipation”) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), quoting Department of Labor 
v Kast Metals Corp, 744 F2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir 1984). 
 49 Texas v United States, 787 F3d at 765–66, quoting Kast Metals Corp, 744 F2d at 1153. 
 50 See, for example, Sequoia Orange Co v Yeutter, 973 F2d 752, 757 (9th Cir 1992) 
(“We have rejected the notion that procedural rules with a substantive impact are subject 
2020] Necessary “Procedures” 2185 
 
All else equal, agencies almost certainly prefer that courts 
scrutinize their putative procedural rules under the substantive-
value-judgment test. It is easy to see why. Asking whether a rule 
has a “substantial impact” on “substantive rights and interests” 
might seem cleaner than the DC Circuit’s “more intricate pro-
cess.”51 Without the limiting principle of the substantive-value-
judgment test, however, the Fifth Circuit’s test is less forgiving to 
agencies seeking to administer their programs without the con-
stant burden of notice and comment. Aside from the obvious im-
plications on the rights of regulated parties, the choice between 
the two involves a trade-off between agency flexibility and judicial 
economy. As we shall see later,52 when flexibility is of special con-
cern, the substantive-value-judgment test is an attractive choice. 
B. The Medicare Act Amendments of 1987 
1. History of the amendments and early case law 
interpreting § 1395hh(a)(2). 
Generally speaking, public benefits programs like Medicare 
are not subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement.53 
Nonetheless, for much of its early history, CMS’s predecessor, the 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), subjected many 
of its rules to notice and comment voluntarily.54 During the 1980s, 
 
to the notice and comment requirements.”) (quotation marks omitted), opinion amended 
on denial of rehearing, 985 F2d 1419 (9th Cir 1993). See also American Hospital Associa-
tion, 834 F2d at 1047 (“The [DC Circuit’s] gradual move away from looking solely into the 
substantiality of the impact reflects a candid recognition that even unambiguously proce-
dural measures affect parties to some degree.”). In the past, some courts also employed 
the substantial-impact test to differentiate legislative from interpretive rules, but the test 
has since been roundly rejected in that context. For an excellent account of the factors that 
led to the substantial-impact test’s near-demise, see generally Kathleen Taylor, Note, The 
Substantial Impact Test: Victim of the Fallout from Vermont Yankee?, 53 Geo Wash L Rev 
118 (1984). 
 51 Texas v United States, 787 F3d at 765–66. 
 52 See Part III. 
 53 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1808. This is because § 553, which governs the notice-
and-comment process, does not apply to any “matter relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.” 5 USC § 553(a)(2). 
Unless the organic statute (that is, the statute authorizing the agency to act) specifies 
otherwise, the agency is free to issue any rule concerning this subject matter without no-
tice and comment regardless of whether it falls under one of the § 553(b) exemptions out-
lined above. 
 54 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1820–21 (Breyer dissenting) (describing the impetus for 
and history of the Medicare Act amendments of 1987). See also Part II.B. 
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however, HCFA loosened its commitment to this practice.55 In re-
sponse, Congress amended the Medicare Act in 198656 and again 
in 198757 to codify a requirement that certain Medicare rules go 
through notice and comment. The final statutory provision read 
in relevant part: 
No rule, requirement, or other statement of policy (other than 
a national coverage determination) that establishes or 
changes a substantive legal standard governing the scope of 
benefits, the payment for services, or the eligibility of indi-
viduals, entities, or organizations to furnish or receive ser-
vices or benefits under this subchapter shall take effect un-
less it is promulgated by the Secretary by regulation under 
[42 USC § 1395hh(a)(1)].58 
The Medicare Act amendments included some notable deviations 
from the APA. Most importantly, whereas the APA specifies 
which rules are exempt from notice and comment,59 the Medicare 
Act specifies which rules are subject to notice and comment: “sub-
stantive legal standard[s].”60 In other words, the APA defines its 
notice-and-comment coverage in the negative, while the Medicare 
Act defines its notice-and-comment coverage in the positive. As 
we shall see later,61 this framing difference could have important 
implications on the proper interpretation of the Medicare Act. 
Just a few years ago, the Medicare Act amendments would 
have seemed of no special significance to the notice-and-comment 
debate. For decades, the courts of appeals that confronted the 
question universally held that the scope of the term “substantive 
legal standard” in the Medicare Act was coextensive with that of 
legislative rules under the APA. Therefore, courts agreed that the 
Medicare Act, like the APA, did not subject interpretive rules to 
 
 55 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1820–21 (Breyer dissenting). The legislative history and 
the Federal Register contain little indication of why HCFA drifted away from notice and 
comment, but it is easy to imagine the temptation of an agency not statutorily bound by 
§ 553 to issue rules without jumping through procedural hoops when the agency thinks it 
can get away with that. 
 56 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-509 § 9321(e), 100 Stat 
1874, 2017–18 (1986), codified at 42 USC § 1395hh. For discussion of the 1986 amend-
ments, see Part II.B.2. 
 57 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-203 § 4035(b)(2), 
101 Stat 1330-55, 1330-78 (1987), codified at 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 58 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 59 See 5 USC § 553(b). 
 60 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 61 See Part II.B. 
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notice and comment.62 A few circuits declined to decide the ques-
tion,63 while those that did typically disposed of it in one or two 
sentences without much analysis.64 It would be decades before 
any court took a contrary position. 
2. The Allina case. 
In 2017, the DC Circuit issued its opinion in Allina Health 
Services v Price65 (Allina I), becoming the first court to hold that 
the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment requirement for “sub-
stantive legal standard[s]”66 was different from the APA’s for leg-
islative rules.67 The case concerned CMS’s decision to start includ-
ing Medicare Part C beneficiaries in the “fractions” it used to 
calculate reimbursement to hospitals treating disproportionate 
numbers of low-income patients.68 Since Part C beneficiaries are 
typically wealthier than other Medicare beneficiaries, the inclu-
sion of Part C patients in the calculation resulted in some hospi-
tals receiving significantly less “disproportionate share” reim-
bursement.69 The plaintiffs, hospitals that treated a significant 
number of Part C beneficiaries, argued that § 1395hh(a)(2) re-
quired CMS to subject its new policy to notice and comment.70 
In a unanimous opinion by then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, a 
panel of the DC Circuit agreed. The Government argued that the 
change in calculations amounted to an interpretive rule within 
the meaning of the APA, but the court saw that issue as irrele-
vant because “the Medicare Act does not incorporate the APA’s 
interpretive-rule exception to the notice-and-comment require-
ment.”71 After describing the textual differences between the two 
 
 62 See, for example, Via Christi Regional Medical Center, Inc v Leavitt, 509 F3d 1259, 
1271 n 11 (10th Cir 2007); Baptist Health v Thompson, 458 F3d 768, 776 n 9 (8th Cir 2006); 
Omni Manor Nursing Home v Thompson, 151 F Appx 427, 431 (6th Cir 2005); Warder v 
Shalala, 149 F3d 73, 79 n 4 (1st Cir 1998). 
 63 See Erringer v Thompson, 371 F3d 625, 633 (9th Cir 2004); Monmouth Medical 
Center v Thompson, 257 F3d 807, 814 (DC Cir 2001). 
 64 See, for example, Baptist Health, 458 F3d at 776 n 8 (“As a corollary, [the plaintiff] 
argues that the change in position violates Medicare rule-change procedures in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395hh(a)(2). . . . However, we agree with the courts that have held that this provision 
imposes no standards greater than those established by the APA.”). 
 65 863 F3d 937 (DC Cir 2017). 
 66 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 67 Allina I, 863 F3d at 944. 
 68 Id at 938–40. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id at 940–41. 
 71 Allina I, 863 F3d at 944. 
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statutes, the court concluded that it “must respect Congress’s use 
of different language and its establishment of different notice-
and-comment requirements in the Medicare Act and the APA.”72 
The court did not go into much detail, however, in explaining pre-
cisely how the Medicare Act’s requirement differs from the APA’s. 
In what I term the “dictionary approach,” it cited a dictionary def-
inition of “substantive law” for the proposition that “[a] ‘substan-
tive legal standard’ at a minimum includes a standard that ‘cre-
ates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of 
parties,’” and reasoned that “[t]hat is precisely what HHS’s 2012 
Medicare fractions do.”73 The DC Circuit in Allina I thus created 
a circuit split as to whether the APA and Medicare Act’s notice-
and-comment requirements are coextensive,74 but offered an in-
complete answer as to precisely where the Medicare Act draws 
the line. 
Partial resolution of this circuit split came in short order. In 
Allina II, the Supreme Court affirmed the DC Circuit’s holding 
that the Medicare Act did not incorporate the APA’s interpretive 
rule exemption. Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion, however, 
expressly declined to say where the Medicare Act drew the line be-
tween rules that are subject to notice and comment and those that 
are not. The Court decided the issue on perhaps the narrowest 
grounds possible, holding simply that “the phrase ‘substantive le-
gal standard,’ which appears in [§ 1395hh(a)(2)] and apparently 
nowhere else in the U.S. Code, cannot bear the same construction 
as the term ‘substantive rule’ in the APA.”75 The Court found it un-
necessary to “go so far as to say that the [plaintiffs’] interpretation, 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id at 943, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (West 10th ed 2014). 
 74 See Allina I, 863 F3d at 945 (“We recognize that we are breaking with several 
other courts of appeals by holding that the Medicare Act does not incorporate all of the 
APA’s exceptions to the notice-and-comment requirement.”). For an argument (made be-
fore the Supreme Court decided the issue) that the DC Circuit was wrong to do so, see 
Graham Haviland, Comment, Not So Different After All: The Status of Interpretive Rules 
in the Medicare Act, 85 U Chi L Rev 1511, 1527–40, 1542 (2018) (“[T]he DC Circuit misin-
terpreted the term ‘substantive legal standard’ and unduly emphasized the statute’s ex-
press exceptions in arguing that interpretive rules are subject to the statute’s notice-and-
comment requirement.”). 
 75 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1814. Note that the Court used the word “substantive” here 
as the opposite of “interpretive” rather than as the opposite of “procedural.” See id at 1811 
(“Under the APA, ‘substantive rules’ are those that have the ‘force and effect of law,’ while 
‘interpretive rules’ are those that merely ‘advise the public of the agency’s construction of 
the statutes and rules which it administers.’”), quoting Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 
S Ct at 1204. 
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adopted by the court of appeals, is correct in every particular.”76 
Instead, it concluded, “It is enough to say the government’s argu-
ments for reversal fail to withstand scrutiny.”77 The Court thus 
established that whatever the Medicare Act did exempt from no-
tice and comment, it did not exempt interpretive rules. 
As the lone dissenter,78 Justice Stephen Breyer criticized this 
lack of guidance, accusing the majority of “not only leav[ing] the 
APA behind,” but also “fail[ing] to substitute any reasonably clear 
alternative standard.”79 He noted that CMS “has issued tens of 
thousands of pages of manual instructions, interpretive rules, and 
other guidance documents.”80 Justice Breyer worried that appli-
cation of the Allina I standard, which the majority did not rule 
out, might invalidate a significant number of these rules, and 
could “substantially undermine and even cripple the administra-
tion of the Medicare scheme.”81 He further warned that the ma-
jority’s “lack of explanation” concerning the appropriate standard 
could “lead to legal challenges to the validity of interpretive rules 
(or even procedural rules) previously thought to have been set-
tled”82 and gave a list of provisions in CMS’s Provider Reimburse-
ment Manual that could be in danger.83 
 The majority downplayed Justice Breyer’s concerns, pointing 
out that he cited “only eight manual provisions that courts have 
deemed interpretive over the last four decades.”84 Moreover, the 
majority claimed, the Government had not argued “that providing 
notice and comment for these or any other specific manual provi-
sions would prove excessively burdensome,” nor had it pointed to 
“any court decision invalidating a manual provision under 
 
 76 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1814. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Justice Kavanaugh, the author of the DC Circuit’s opinion, took no part in the 
consideration of the case on appeal. See id at 1808. 
 79 Id at 1823 (Breyer dissenting). 
 80 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1822 (Breyer dissenting). 
 81 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id at 1824. 
 83 Id at 1822–23. 
 84 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1816 (majority) (emphasis omitted). 
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§ 1395hh(a)(2) in the nearly two years since” Allina I was de-
cided.85 Nevertheless, the majority refused to provide its own def-
inition of “substantive legal standard,” insisting that “[o]ther 
questions about the statute’s meaning can await other cases.”86 
So here is the effect of Allina II: The Supreme Court has 
closed one question and left another wide open. We now know that 
“substantive legal standard” does not mean the same thing as 
“legislative rule,” but we have no idea what it does mean. In es-
sence, the Court merely ruled out one of many possible interpre-
tations of the Medicare statute. The DC Circuit has offered one 
plausible (if incomplete) interpretation, and now the other cir-
cuits can choose either to adopt that interpretation or to propose 
a new one, so long as it is not coextensive with the definition of 
legislative rules under the APA. With the ink barely dry on Al-
lina II, it remains to be seen whether courts will take that deci-
sion as an invitation to innovate. 
3. Subsequent developments. 
In the DC Circuit, which is still committed to its dictionary 
approach, only two further cases implicating the Medicare Act’s 
notice-and-comment requirement have received a final judgment 
on the merits since Allina I. These cases reached opposite conclu-
sions. In Clarian Health West, LLC v Hargan87 (Clarian II), de-
cided before the Supreme Court’s Allina II decision, the DC Cir-
cuit held that new guidance concerning when to apply an old 
reimbursement formula did not alter a substantive legal standard 
because it did not change the plaintiff hospitals’ entitlement to 
reimbursement—it simply changed the procedures for processing 
that reimbursement.88 Clarian II did not alter the dictionary ap-
proach and presumably remains good law in the DC Circuit fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s refusal to take a position on that ap-
proach in Allina II. 
 
 85 Id. The first of these contentions took some liberty in characterizing the Govern-
ment’s argument. The Government did in fact argue that “the court of appeals’ rationale, 
if taken to its logical conclusion, would subject nearly all of CMS’s nonbinding manuals 
and interpretive materials to the notice-and-comment process” and that it would be “diffi-
cult even to estimate the disruptive effect that would have on the Medicare program.” 
Brief for the Petitioner, Azar v Allina Health Services, No 17-1484, *42 (US filed Nov 13, 
2018) (alteration in original) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 5962884) (Azar Brief). 
 86 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1814. 
 87 878 F3d 346 (DC Cir 2017). 
 88 Id at 354–56. 
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Following Allina II, the DC District Court decided Select Spe-
cialty Hospital-Denver, Inc v Azar.89 In that case, CMS had re-
quired that providers obtain a certain form, available in some 
states only to Medicaid-participating providers, in order to re-
ceive reimbursement for unpaid debts of patients eligible for both 
Medicare and Medicaid.90 Some of the plaintiff hospitals were un-
able to enroll in Medicaid under state law.91 The court held that 
the rule did alter a substantive legal standard because it “essen-
tially changed the eligibility criteria for reimbursement . . . by re-
quiring provider participation in the state Medicaid program.”92 
In a subsequent opinion denying HHS’s motion for reconsidera-
tion, the court explained that under the DC Circuit’s interpreta-
tion, § 1395hh(a)(2) “‘distinguishes a substantive from a proce-
dural legal standard,’ and requires that CMS conduct notice and 
comment rulemaking for changes to the former but not to the lat-
ter type of standard.”93 
Taking Allina I, Clarian II, and Select Specialty Hospital as 
the only three data points for courts bound by the DC Circuit’s 
dictionary approach to § 1395hh(a)(2), it is difficult to produce 
any more than a rough sketch of that interpretation’s limits. It 
cannot be a pure substantial-impact test, as the policy at issue in 
Clarian II cost the plaintiff hospital over $2 million in reimburse-
ment.94 But Select Specialty Hospital’s invalidation of a rule that, 
in at least some applications, seems to have been aimed at proce-
dural efficiency might imply that the dictionary approach affords 
agencies somewhat less flexibility than does American Hospital 
Association’s substantive-value-judgment test.95 
At least one court outside the DC Circuit has offered a unify-
ing theory of the cases applying the dictionary approach. In Po-
lansky v Executive Health Resources, Inc,96 the Eastern District of 
 
 89 391 F Supp 3d 53 (DDC 2019). 
 90 Id at 58–60. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id at 69. 
 93 Select Specialty Hospital-Denver, Inc v Azar, 2019 WL 5697076 at *3 (DDC) (em-
phasis in original) (alteration omitted), quoting Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1811. 
 94 Clarian II, 878 F3d at 351–52. 
 95 I admit this characterization lacks some nuance. For a thorough discussion of how 
the dictionary approach and the American Hospital Association test might differ as applied 
to Select Specialty Hospital, see Part III.B.2. 
 96 422 F Supp 3d 916 (ED Pa 2019). The facts of this case are not important for un-
derstanding the court’s treatment of the dictionary approach, but they become relevant in 
contrasting that approach with the substantive-value-judgment test. Accordingly, I ex-
plain the facts later. See notes 208–12 and accompanying text. 
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Pennsylvania adopted the DC Circuit’s interpretation of 
§ 1395hh(a)(2)97 and fleshed out that interpretation by comparing 
the facts and dispositions of Allina I, Clarian II, and Select Spe-
cialty Hospital.98 According to the Polansky court, those cases 
illuminate[ ] a distinction between, on the one hand, rules 
that determine reimbursement and, on the other, statements 
that set forth enforcement policies. If a policy affects the right 
to, or amount of reimbursement, it is more likely to be 
deemed a “substantive legal standard” under the Circuit’s 
definition. Conversely, if a policy does not affect the authority 
of CMS, but simply provides instructions for enforcement, it 
is more likely not to be characterized as a “substantive legal 
standard.”99 
If this characterization is correct, it seems conceptually different 
from the DC Circuit’s approach to procedural rules under the 
APA, which focuses on a rule’s subject matter rather than the 
rule’s outcome-determinacy alone.100 It is not clear that this dis-
tinction is what the DC Circuit had in mind when it decided Al-
lina I and Clarian II, but it is perhaps the most persuasive expla-
nation of how those cases fit together with each other and with 
Select Specialty Hospital. At any rate, Polansky is currently the 
only decision outside the DC Circuit to offer a detailed explana-
tion of its interpretation of § 1395hh(a)(2).101 It remains to be seen 
whether other courts will offer alternative interpretations. 
II.  THE RECONCILED PROCEDURAL READING 
In some sense, Allina II has sent the search for the meaning 
of “substantive legal standard” back to square one. The Supreme 
 
 97 Polansky, 422 F Supp 3d at 934 (“This Court adopts the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit’s definition for ‘substantive legal standard’ and will assess the Medicare Act’s notice 
and comment requirement as it applies to the [challenged policy] accordingly.”). 
 98 See id at 934–36. 
 99 Id at 934–35. 
 100 See Part I.A.2. 
 101 Two other cases implicating Allina bear mentioning. In Agendia, Inc v Azar, 420 
F Supp 3d 985 (CD Cal 2019), the Central District of California appeared to adopt the DC 
Circuit’s dictionary approach in the process of deciding that § 1395hh(a)(2) applies to local 
coverage determinations made by CMS’s contractors even though the statute expressly 
exempts national coverage determinations made by CMS. Id at 987–89, 997. And in Yale 
New Haven Hospital v Azar, 2020 WL 2204197 (D Conn), the District of Connecticut ex-
pressed no opinion on the proper interpretation of the phrase “substantive legal standard,” 
simply concluding in a footnote that it was “undisputed” that the rule at issue in that case 
established such a standard. Id at *11 n 10. 
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Court remained agnostic as to whether § 1395hh(a)(2) was in-
tended to differentiate substantive from procedural rules.102 The 
DC Circuit has suggested as much, but it has thus far refrained 
from applying its more nuanced test for the APA’s procedural rule 
exemption103 in the Medicare context. Instead, it has offered some 
general meditations on substance and procedure, supported only 
by a dictionary definition and untethered to any preexisting body 
of case law. 
Rather than conjuring a novel definition of “substantive legal 
standard” out of thin air, I argue that the best reading of 
§ 1395hh(a)(2) is one that draws precisely the same line that the 
APA draws between substantive and procedural rules. This Part 
lays out what I term the “reconciled procedural reading”—a read-
ing that explains how Congress could have attempted to accom-
plish the same effect between the two statutes by using different 
language. Part II.A explains how the text of the APA’s procedural 
rule exemption fits into the logic of Allina II and the Medicare 
statute. Part II.B examines the legislative history of the Medicare 
Act amendments and argues that incorporating the APA’s proce-
dural rule exemption is likely what Congress had in mind all 
along. 
A. The Logic of Allina II and the Puzzle of the Medicare Act’s 
Text 
The Allina II majority spent a great deal of time comparing 
the text of the Medicare Act with that of the APA to rule out the 
possibility that the former exempts interpretive rules from notice 
and comment. Section 553(b) of the APA includes four exemptions 
to that statute’s notice-and-comment requirement: “[1] interpre-
tative rules, [2] general statements of policy, . . . [3] rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice,” and “[4] good 
cause.”104 The Court in Allina II set out to take stock of these cate-
gories in the text of the Medicare Act, but it only counted to three. 
In the majority’s view, the text of the Medicare statute ex-
pressly eschews the APA’s exemption to notice and comment for 
“general statements of policy.”105 First, the Court noted that 
§ 1395hh(a)(2) itself “contemplates that ‘statements of policy’ . . . 
 
 102 See Part I.B.2. 
 103 See Part I.A.2. 
 104 5 USC § 553(b)(A)–(B). 
 105 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
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can establish or change a ‘substantive legal standard.’ Yet, by def-
inition under the APA, statements of policy are not substantive; 
instead they are grouped with and treated as interpretive 
rules.”106 The Court then pointed out that another provision of the 
statute, § 1395hh(e)(1), “gives the government limited authority 
to make retroactive ‘substantive change[s]’ in, among other 
things, ‘interpretative rules’ and ‘statements of policy.’”107 The 
Court concluded that “this statutory authority would make no 
sense if the Medicare Act used the term ‘substantive’ as the APA 
does,” because “interpretive rules and statements of policy—and 
any changes to them—are not substantive under the APA by def-
inition.”108 Notably, the subsection the Court pointed to makes no 
mention of procedural rules.109 Thus, the Court did not expressly 
rule out the possibility that the Medicare Act adopts the APA’s 
procedural rule exemption. 
The good cause exemption110 is even easier, because the Med-
icare Act incorporates it expressly by cross-reference in 
§ 1395hh(b)(2)(C).111 The Court viewed this fact as another indi-
cation that Congress did not intend to borrow the interpretive 
rule exemption because the statute’s drafters “could have easily 
cross-referenced that exemption in exactly the same way” but 
chose not to.112 So far, so good: the policy statement exemption is 
not incorporated into the Medicare Act, the good cause exemption 
is, and the procedural rule exemption is still theoretically in 
play.113 
The Court then concluded that the Medicare Act does not bor-
row the APA’s exemption for interpretive rules.114 It did so for 
three main reasons. First, the Medicare Act groups interpretive 
 
 106 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1811 (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 107 Id at 1812 (alteration in original). 
 108 Id (emphasis in original). Again, the Court uses “substantive” in the sense of “leg-
islative” rather than as the opposite of “procedural.” See note 75. 
 109 See 42 USC § 1395hh(e)(1)(A) (explaining the retroactive applicability of any “sub-
stantive change in regulations, manual instructions, interpretative rules, statements of 
policy, or guidelines of general applicability”). 
 110 5 USC § 553(b)(B). 
 111 See 42 USC § 1395hh(b)(2)(C). 
 112 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1813. 
 113 Of course, the drafters of § 1395hh(a)(2) also failed to cross-reference the APA’s 
procedural rule exemption. But that failure seems far less fatal to the procedural rule 
exemption than it was to the interpretive rule exemption since the plain meaning of the 
word “substantive,” which the drafters ultimately chose, is the opposite of “procedural.” 
See note 162 and accompanying text. 
 114 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1814. 
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rules with policy statements and makes the former subject to no-
tice and comment.115 Second, the Medicare Act does not cross-
reference the APA’s interpretive rule exemption like it does the 
good cause exemption.116 Third, the Court found no indication in 
the legislative history that Congress had interpretive rules in 
mind.117 On the final count, then, the Medicare Act borrows the 
APA’s good cause exemption and leaves behind its interpretive 
rule exemption and its policy statement exemption. But that ac-
counts for only three of § 553(b)’s four exemptions. What of the 
remaining exemption—“rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice”?118 The Court mentioned this exemption only in pass-
ing119 and engaged in no analysis of whether the Medicare Act bor-
rows it. 
Allina II thus left the puzzle unsolved as to what happened 
to the APA’s procedural rule exemption in the drafting of the Med-
icare Act. On the one hand, the Medicare Act does not “expressly 
borrow[ ]”120 the phrase “rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice,” either by reproduction or by cross-reference. If failure 
to expressly borrow one exemption indicates that Congress did 
not intend to incorporate that exemption in the new statute, one 
might ask why the same logic would not also apply to the other 
exemption. Justice Breyer appears to have anticipated this con-
cern and thus worried in his dissent that the majority opinion 
“may also lead to legal challenges to the validity of interpretive 
rules (or even procedural rules) previously thought to have been 
settled.”121 On the other hand, as the DC Circuit seems to have 
recognized, the most natural reading of “substantive” is as the 
opposite of “procedural.” Once one examines the legislative his-
tory of the Medicare statute, a picture begins to emerge as to why 
Congress may have chosen the “phrase ‘substantive legal stand-
ard,’ which appears in [§ 1395hh(a)(2)] and apparently nowhere 
else in the U.S. Code.”122 
 
 115 Id at 1811–12. 
 116 Id at 1812–14. 
 117 Id at 1814–16. 
 118 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 119 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1812, quoting 5 USC § 553(b)(A); Allina II, 139 S Ct at 
1815 (rejecting an argument based on American Hospital Association because that case 
“was mostly about the APA’s treatment of procedural rules”) (emphasis in original). 
 120 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1813. 
 121 Id at 1824 (Breyer dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 122 Id at 1814 (majority). 
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B. The Legislative History of the Medicare Act Amendments 
This Section explores how the legislative history of the Med-
icare Act amendments can help solve the puzzle of their text. 
While the Court in Allina II found the legislative history “murky” 
with respect to the interpretive rule exemption,123 congressional 
intent to carry over the procedural rule exemption appears more 
clearly. 
1. The voluntary notice-and-comment era. 
Long before Congress amended the Medicare statute to codify 
notice-and-comment procedures for CMS (then HCFA), the 
agency voluntarily subjected its rules to notice and comment.124 
This practice began formally in 1971, when the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare—the department of which HCFA 
was a part—issued a policy statement that, “[e]ffective immedi-
ately, all agencies and offices of the Department which issue rules 
and regulations relating to public . . . benefits . . . are directed to 
utilize the public participation procedures of the APA.”125 Pro-
posed regulations from this period suggest that HCFA took this 
command at face value.126 Presumably, HCFA would have looked 
to § 553 not only for the procedures it sets out, but also for the 
exemptions it includes. Indeed, prior to 1986, the agency repeat-
edly invoked the good cause exemption in particular.127 It was 
against this backdrop, with HCFA having previously followed the 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, that Congress 
 
 123 Id at 1815. 
 124 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1820–21 (Breyer dissenting) (describing the impetus for 
and history of the Medicare Act amendments of 1987). See also Part I.B.1. 
 125 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of the Secretary, Public Partic-
ipation in Rule Making: Statement of Policy, 36 Fed Reg 2532, 2532 (1971), citing 5 USC § 553. 
 126 See, for example, Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid; 
Payment for the Cost of Malpractice Insurance, 51 Fed Reg 11142, 11194 (1986) (“We vol-
untarily follow the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(5 U.S.C. 553) in issuing Medicare rules.”). 
 127 See, for example, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration, Training for Medicaid, 42 Fed Reg 60566, 60566 (1977) (“Since 
these are merely technical conforming amendments, the Department finds that there is 
good cause to waive public notice and opportunity for comment.”); Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Program; 
Court Ordered Regulations Regarding Prospective Payment Amount and Administrative 
Review, 50 Fed Reg 27208, 27210 (1985) (“[The notice and comment] requirement does not 
apply when an agency finds good cause that such a notice-and-comment procedure is im-
practicable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. . . . [W]e find good cause to 
waive proposed rulemaking.”). 
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amended the Medicare statute. Thus, one would expect that stat-
ute’s new notice-and-comment provision to carry over the work-
ings of the APA’s provision, at least to some extent. 
2. Congress codifies a notice-and-comment requirement. 
In a first attempt to respond to concerns that HCFA was be-
ginning to shirk the notice-and-comment obligations it had volun-
tarily assumed, Congress added a provision to the Medicare Act 
in 1986 requiring notice and comment “before issuing in final 
form any [Medicare] regulation” that did not fall under the APA’s 
good cause exemption.128 This amendment evidently did not have 
its intended effect. In a report on an earlier version of the 1987 
amendments, the House Budget Committee expressed concern 
that the 1986 notice-and-comment “provision did not [ ] define a 
regulation for that purpose,” and thus “that important policies 
[were] being developed without benefit of the public notice and 
comment period and, with growing frequency, [were] being trans-
mitted, if at all, through manual instructions and other informal 
means.”129 
As a result, the House passed a version of the 1987 bill re-
quiring that any rule with a “significant effect” on Medicare pay-
ments undergo notice and comment.130 The Budget Committee 
opined that this language would apply to “all [rules] which are of 
general applicability and have a significant effect on Medicare en-
rollees, on providers, or on the administration of the program,” 
including 
any policy that had an effect on the eligibility of individuals for 
Medicare, on the scope of benefits, on the payment methodol-
ogy or amount of payment for services, or on the qualifica-
tions of practitioners or providers to furnish reimbursable 
services or the terms under which such services can be fur-
nished.131 
According to at least some members of the enacting Congress, 
then, this earlier draft subjected a remarkably broad swath of 
Medicare rules to notice and comment. 
 
 128 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9321(e)(1), 100 Stat at 2017. 
 129 HR Rep No 100-391(I), 100th Cong, 1st Sess 430 (1987). 
 130 HR 3545, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (Oct 26, 1987), in 133 Cong Rec 29966, 30019 (Oct 
29, 1987). 
 131 HR Rep No 100-391(I) at 430 (cited in note 129). 
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After different versions of the bill passed in the House and 
Senate, however, the conference committee amended the provi-
sion to include its current language, purportedly “to clarify that 
only policies establishing or changing a substantive legal stand-
ard governing benefits, payment, or eligibility must be promul-
gated as regulations,” and to “reflect[ ] recent court rulings.”132 
To be sure, the conference committee did not change the 
heading “Publication as Regulations of Significant Policies” in the 
final bill,133 and the House Ways and Means Committee still ex-
pressed its understanding that the final version of the notice-and-
comment requirement would extend to “[s]ignificant policy 
changes.”134 But the change in the text and the conference com-
mittee’s stated rationale for it could offer a significant clue as to 
what Congress meant when it enacted the final statute. 
3. Making sense of the conference committee report. 
The conference committee report’s reference to “recent court 
rulings” suggests that, in amending the earlier draft’s broader 
language, Congress intended to incorporate the APA’s procedural 
rule exemption as interpreted in American Hospital Association. 
The phrases “significant effect”135 and “substantive legal stand-
ard”136 echo terminology used throughout that then-recent land-
mark decision, in which the DC Circuit announced what I re-
ferred to as the substantive-value-judgment test.137 Recall that 
under this test, a rule may be procedural if it is aimed primarily 
at the agency’s internal workings, even if it has an incidental ef-
fect on the rights and duties of regulated parties.138 Prior to Amer-
ican Hospital Association, the DC Circuit had sometimes applied 
the substantial-impact test to differentiate substantive from pro-
cedural rules under the APA.139 In American Hospital Association, 
 
 132 HR Conf Rep No 100-495, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 566 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 133 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 4035(b), 101 Stat at 1330-78 (em-
phasis added). 
 134 House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Cong, 1st Sess, Summary of Confer-
ence Agreement on Reconciliation Provisions Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Ways and Means 13 (Comm Print 1987). 
 135 HR 3545 at 30019 (cited in note 130). 
 136 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 137 See Part I.A.2. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See, for example, Pickus v United States Board of Parole, 507 F2d 1107, 1113 (DC 
Cir 1974) (“[A] matter ‘relating to practice or procedure’ means technical regulation of the 
form of agency action and proceedings. This category [ ] should not be deemed to include 
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the court acknowledged its shift from “asking whether a given 
procedure has a ‘substantial impact’ on parties . . . to inquiring 
more broadly whether the agency action also encodes a substan-
tive value judgment or puts a stamp of approval or disapproval 
on a given type of behavior.”140 Throughout its opinion, the court 
repeatedly measured the rule in question against the “substan-
tive standard[s]” of the organic statute.141 
Indeed, once one takes a closer look at then-extant case law, 
it is hard to imagine the conference committee’s reference to “re-
cent court rulings”142 as being to any other case. American Hospi-
tal Association appears to be the only case decided prior to the 
1987 Medicare Act amendments in which a court discussed “sub-
stantive standards” in relation to any serious notice-and-comment 
analysis under 5 USC § 553(b).143 And a “recent court ruling[ ]”144 
it was. American Hospital Association was decided on December 
4, 1987— just over five weeks after the original version of the 
Medicare Act amendments passed the House,145 and eighteen 
days before the conference committee issued its report.146 The 
committee lawyers who were likely drafting the final version 
would have had just enough time to learn about this important 
case and incorporate its language so as “to clarify that only poli-
cies establishing or changing a substantive legal standard gov-
erning benefits, payment, or eligibility must be promulgated as 
regulations.”147 
 
any action which goes beyond formality and substantially affects the rights of those over 
whom the agency exercises authority.”) (emphasis added). 
 140 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 141 Id at 1055. 
 142 HR Conf Rep No 100-495 at 566 (cited in note 132). 
 143 Three possible exceptions warrant mention. The District of Colorado used the 
phrases “substantive requirements” and “substantive standards” in distinguishing Amer-
ican Hospital Association from the facts of its own case. See Estate of Smith v Bowen, 675 
F Supp 586, 589–90 (D Colo 1987). Two other district courts each used the phrase in brief, 
near-identical footnotes declining to decide notice-and-comment challenges to the same 
regulation. See Dixon v Heckler, 589 F Supp 1494, 1506 n 34 (SDNY 1984); Wilson v Heckler, 
622 F Supp 649, 654 n 8 (D NJ 1985). Given that the first of these cases simply distin-
guished American Hospital Association and the others were decided years before the 
House drafted the original version of the bill, it seems unlikely that any of these cases 
were what the conference committee had in mind. 
 144 HR Conf Rep No 100-495 at 566 (cited in note 132) (emphasis added). 
 145 See HR 3545 at 30019 (cited in note 130). 
 146 See HR Conf Rep No 100-495 at 566 (cited in note 132). 
 147 Id (emphasis added). 
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But I am not the first to seize on this language in the confer-
ence committee report. Citing this language and similar terminol-
ogy in American Hospital Association, the Government in Al-
lina II argued that American Hospital Association “forms the 
backdrop for the very language (‘establishes or changes a sub-
stantive legal standard’) that Congress enacted to ‘reflect[ ] recent 
court rulings.’”148 The Court rejected this argument because even 
if the conference committee report contained “an oblique refer-
ence to [American Hospital Association],” that case “was mostly 
about the APA’s treatment of procedural rules.”149 In the Court’s 
view, then, it was “at least equally plausible that the conference 
committee revised the House’s language because it feared that 
language would have subjected procedural rules to notice-and-
comment obligations.”150 
In other words, the Government may have been right that the 
statute’s drafters were thinking of American Hospital Associa-
tion, but its principal mistake was failing to recognize that that 
case “was mostly about the APA’s treatment of procedural [rather 
than interpretive] rules.”151 Furthermore, as the Government ne-
glected to emphasize in its brief, American Hospital Association 
was not just “[o]ne of the most significant then-recent court rul-
ings”152—it was the only significant then-recent ruling that used 
the words “substantive” and “standard” in a manner similar to 
§ 1395hh(a)(2).153 Thus, the conference report, read in conjunction 
with American Hospital Association, would seem to support a 
reading of § 1395hh(a)(2) as the mirror image of the APA’s proce-
dural rule exemption, despite the failure of a similar argument 
concerning interpretive rules in Allina II. It appears the drafters 
of § 1395hh(a)(2) were thinking not merely of a general distinc-
tion between substance and procedure, but of a specific interpre-
tation (American Hospital Association’s) of the distinction a spe-





 148 Azar Brief at *36–37 (cited in note 85) (alteration in original), quoting HR Conf 
Rep No 100-495 at 566 (cited in note 132). 
 149 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1815 (emphasis in original). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id (emphasis in original). 
 152 Azar Brief at *36 (cited in note 85). 
 153 See note 143 and accompanying text. 
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4. Tying it all together: positive framing and drafting 
procedure. 
Still, one might ask: If Congress had the APA’s procedural 
rule exemption in mind, why did it not cross-reference that ex-
emption expressly, as it did with the good cause exemption?154 The 
answer may lie in the constraints of language and the realities of 
drafting procedure. The APA’s notice-and-comment provision de-
fines only which rules are not subject to notice and comment.155 
The Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment provision, by contrast, 
defines which rules are subject to notice and comment—and it has 
done so since its first iteration in 1986.156 Recall that according to 
the House Budget Committee, the impetus behind the 1987 
amendments was that the 1986 version “did not . . . define a reg-
ulation” for the purposes of the notice-and-comment require-
ment.157 In seeking to “define a regulation,” the statute’s drafters 
were already working with an existing text that defined the notice-
and-comment requirement in positive rather than negative 
terms. The earlier version of the 1987 bill that passed the House 
retained this positive framing, again specifying which rules were 
subject to notice and comment.158 
At this point, the conference committee was not writing on a 
clean slate. If it indeed sought to incorporate the APA’s proce-
dural rule exemption as interpreted in American Hospital Associ-
ation, it could have done so by rewriting the entire subsection in 
the negative terms of exemptions. But it would have been far eas-
ier to change the clause specifying which rules were subject to 
notice and comment to one that conveyed precisely the opposite 
meaning of “rules of agency organization, procedure, or prac-
tice.”159 It seems likely that the conference committee attempted 
to do just that when it changed the type of rule covered by the 
notice-and-comment provision from one “that has (or may have) a 
 
 154 See Part II.A. 
 155 See 5 USC § 553(b). 
 156 See note 128 and accompanying text. 
 157 HR Rep No 100-391(I) at 430 (cited in note 129). 
 158 See HR 3545 at 30019 (cited in note 130). 
 159 5 USC § 553(b)(A). For a similar argument emphasizing the “piecemeal construc-
tion” of the Medicare Act amendments but without emphasizing the positive and negative 
framing issue, see Haviland, Comment, 85 U Chi L Rev at 1539 (cited in note 74). 
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significant effect”160 to one that “that establishes or changes a sub-
stantive legal standard.”161 After all, “substantive” ordinarily con-
notes the opposite of “procedural,”162 and the court in American 
Hospital Association indicated that “substantive standard[s]” are 
relevant in determining whether a rule is exempt from notice and 
comment.163 On this reading, Congress did not simply forget about 
the APA’s exemption for “rules of agency organization, procedure, 
or practice”164 when it drafted the Medicare Act amendments—it 
incorporated that exemption by negative implication. All four of 
the APA’s exemptions would therefore be accounted for: the pro-
cedural rule and good cause exemptions made the jump from the 
APA to the Medicare Act, while the interpretive rule and policy 
statement exemptions did not. 
III.  THE READING IN PRACTICE 
Having laid out the case for the reconciled procedural reading 
as a matter of statutory interpretation, I turn now to its practical 
implications should courts accept it. As discussed above, largely by 
virtue of its outsized administrative law docket, the DC Circuit is 
the most influential court of appeals on matters of administrative 
law.165 This Part therefore assumes that if courts adopted the rec-
onciled procedural reading and interpreted the Medicare Act as 
borrowing the APA’s exemption for “rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice,”166 the DC Circuit’s test for that exemp-
tion—the substantive-value-judgment test167—would dominate 
Medicare notice-and-comment jurisprudence. Part III.A explores in 
greater detail the case law applying the substantive-value-judgment 
 
 160 HR 3545 at 30019 (cited in note 130). 
 161 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 162 See Part I.A.2. As the DC Circuit rightly recognized in Allina I, dictionary defini-
tions confirm that “substantive” and “procedural” are generally used as antonyms. See 
Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “substantive law” as “[t]he part of 
the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties. Cf. 
PROCEDURAL LAW”) (emphasis added); id (defining “procedural law” as “[t]he rules that 
prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law 
that defines the specific rights or duties themselves. . . . Cf. SUBSTANTIVE LAW”) (emphasis 
added). Dictionaries are helpful for getting a general sense of common usage. I take issue 
only with quoting a dictionary definition as the most comprehensive statement of an im-
portant legal test that district courts will have to parse, as the DC Circuit did in Allina I. 
Rule by Article III judges is one thing—rule by Bryan A. Garner is quite another. 
 163 See American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1055. 
 164 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 165 See note 27 and accompanying text. 
 166 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 167 See Part I.A.2. 
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test under the APA. Part III.B applies the test to the facts of ex-
isting Medicare cases, illustrating how the substantive-value-
judgment test would achieve similar results to the dictionary ap-
proach in many cases but could provide CMS with needed flexi-
bility at the margins. 
A. Case Law Outlining the Substantive-Value-Judgment Test 
American Hospital Association and its progeny suggest a dis-
tinction between policies concerning two different subject matters: 
generally applicable enforcement policies (whatever their effect on 
regulated parties) and policies that single out particular popula-
tions because of their behavior or that vary “standards of review.” 
American Hospital Association itself was a complicated case con-
cerning several documents in which HHS gave instructions to pri-
vate organizations of doctors that Congress had tasked with re-
viewing hospitals’ Medicare reimbursement requests to screen for 
overbilling.168 The three documents to which the APA’s procedural 
rule exemption was most relevant were two manuals and one di-
rective that HHS issued explaining how the organizations would 
go about their daily operations and which (and how many) trans-
actions they would review.169 For example, they were to review a 
set percentage of patient readmissions.170 One passage evaluating 
the first manual captures the thrust of the court’s reasoning with 
respect to all three documents: 
The manual imposes no new burdens on hospitals that war-
rant notice and comment review. This is not a case in which 
HHS has urged its reviewing agents to utilize a different 
standard of review in specified medical areas; rather, it asks 
only that they examine a greater share of operations in given 
medical areas. . . . 
At worst, Manual IM85–2 burdens hospitals by (1) making it 
more likely that their transgressions from Medicare’s stand-
ards will not go unnoticed and (2) imposing on them the inci-
dental inconveniences of complying with an enforcement 
 
 168 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1041–44. The agency actions at issue 
in American Hospital Association would be governed by the Medicare Act’s notice-and-
comment provision today, but they occurred before that provision existed, when HCFA 
ostensibly elected to follow the APA’s notice-and-comment provision. See id (explaining 
the actions, all of which occurred prior to 1985). See also Part II.B.1 (describing HCFA’s 
notice-and-comment practices prior to 1986). 
 169 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1049–52. 
 170 Id. 
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scheme. The former concern is patently illegitimate. . . . As for 
the second burden, case law clearly establishes that such de-
rivative burdens hardly dictate notice and comment review.171 
In other words, even if the policies affected the amount of reim-
bursement the hospitals ultimately received, they still qualified 
as procedural rules because they merely concerned enforcement 
of a value judgment Congress had already made concerning which 
expenses were reimbursable. 
The DC Circuit’s subsequent decision in Air Transport illus-
trates the substantive-value-judgment test in its most demanding 
permutation. In that case, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) issued a set of rules detailing the amounts to be assessed 
for various air-safety violations and establishing a “comprehen-
sive adjudicatory scheme” for the assessment of penalties.172 As 
the court noted, even critics who were not parties to the case 
claimed the rules created a “systematic procedural bias in favor 
of the FAA,” but the FAA nevertheless issued them without notice 
and comment, invoking the APA’s procedural rule exemption.173 
The court held that the exemption did not apply, reasoning that 
the agency’s “choices concerning what process civil penalty de-
fendants are due” each “‘encoded a substantive value judgment’ 
on the appropriate balance between a defendant’s rights to adju-
dicatory procedures and the agency’s interest in efficient prosecu-
tion.”174 Air Transport was vacated as moot for unrelated rea-
sons175 and is thus no longer binding precedent in the DC Circuit, 
but it is important because it represents the outer limit of what 
might qualify as a substantive value judgment in the eyes of a 
particularly skeptical court. It is probably best read as an outlier 
case whose logic is confined to situations in which a regulation 
determines the process due in quasi-criminal proceedings. 
In addition to American Hospital Association and Air 
Transport, the DC Circuit has engaged in detailed analysis of 
whether a rule encodes a substantive value judgment in a handful 
of other cases. In Reeder v FCC,176 several broadcasting companies 
 
 171 Id at 1051. 
 172 Air Transport, 900 F2d at 373. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id at 376, quoting American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047 (alteration, 
citation, and emphasis omitted). 
 175 See generally Air Transport Association of America v Department of Transporta-
tion, 933 F2d 1043 (DC Cir 1991). 
 176 865 F2d 1298 (DC Cir 1989). 
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challenged a “no-substitution” policy the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) had adopted in allocating three new clas-
ses of FM radio stations, under which it would not consider appli-
cations from existing stations to upgrade to one of the new 
classes.177 Invoking American Hospital Association, the court 
found it “quite obvious that the rules changed the substantive cri-
teria for substitution and permanently foreclosed the petitioners 
from pursuing their upgrade plans” and therefore concluded that 
the procedural rule exemption did not apply.178 In JEM Broad-
casting Co v FCC,179 a broadcaster challenged another policy for 
FM radio station applications, under which the FCC refused to 
consider applications that omitted some of the required infor-
mation.180 The plaintiff argued that the policy encoded a substan-
tive value judgment, but the court disagreed, reasoning that 
stretching the test that far “threaten[ed] to swallow the proce-
dural exception to notice and comment, for agency housekeeping 
rules often embody a judgment about what mechanics and pro-
cesses are most efficient.”181 And in Public Citizen v Department 
of State,182 the court sustained as a procedural rule the State De-
partment’s policy against disclosing documents generated after 
the date of an initial Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) re-
quest.183 “Because the Department’s cut-off policy applies to all 
FOIA requests, making no distinction between requests on the 
basis of subject matter,” the court explained, “It clearly encodes 
no ‘substantive value judgment.’”184 
Assuming Air Transport was an aberration, these cases sug-
gest that a nominally procedural rule “encodes a substantive 
value judgment”185 and thus triggers notice and comment if it 
takes aim at a subset of the regulated industry that is behaving 
in a certain way, but not if it is aimed primarily at the agency’s 
 
 177 Id at 1301–02. 
 178 Id at 1305. 
 179 22 F3d 320 (DC Cir 1994). 
 180 Id at 322. 
 181 Id at 328. Recognizing that Air Transport was no longer binding, the JEM Broad-
casting court did not attempt to distinguish it, and in fact disavowed it to the extent that 
it required a contrary result. Id. But the distinction is not difficult to see. In comparison 
to an entire adjudicatory scheme that even included the amounts of fines, a requirement 
that paperwork be substantially completed hardly seems a judgment about “what process 
[broadcasters] are due.” Air Transport, 900 F2d at 376. 
 182 276 F3d 634 (DC Cir 2002). 
 183 Id at 641. 
 184 Id, quoting American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 185 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
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own internal workings and applies to the entire industry equally. 
With this basic principle in mind, the substantive-value-judgment 
test may not be the easiest for courts to administer, but it affords 
agencies far more flexibility in calibrating their internal proce-
dures than does the Fifth Circuit’s substantial-impact test.186 And 
as we shall see, the substantive-value-judgment test is probably 
also more agency-friendly than the dictionary approach to the 
Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment requirement. 
B. Applying the Substantive-Value-Judgment Test to Medicare 
Cases 
1. Existing Medicare cases applying the substantive-value-
judgment test. 
Before speculating as to how the substantive-value-judgment 
test would apply in recent Medicare notice-and-comment cases, it 
is worth noting that at least two district courts bound by Ameri-
can Hospital Association did apply the test in Medicare cases 
prior to Allina I.187 The court in Sierra-Nevada Memorial-Miners 
Hospitals, Inc v Shalala188 held that HCFA’s decision to have hos-
pitals seeking geographic reclassification submit their applica-
tions to their fiscal intermediaries instead of to HCFA directly fell 
under the APA’s procedural rule exemption.189 Invoking American 
Hospital Association and echoing its reasoning, the court ex-
plained that the “rule did not foreclose the plaintiffs’ right to seek 
increased Medicare reimbursement” and “d[id] not authorize the 
intermediaries to apply new reviewing standards or a different 
level of scrutiny.”190 
 
 186 See Part I.A.2. 
 187 Of course, American Hospital Association itself was a Medicare case as well. See 
note 177 and accompanying text. In addition, at least one district court pre–Allina I ap-
plied American Hospital Association to uphold a rule as procedural without expressly us-
ing the phrase “substantive value judgment,” but engaging in similar reasoning. See Bev-
erly Health & Rehabilitation Services, Inc v Thompson, 223 F Supp 2d 73, 100–01 (DDC 
2002) (concluding that a rule setting forth instructions for scrutinizing nursing home re-
imbursement requests was a procedural rule because it simply made it “more likely that 
plaintiffs’ transgressions from Medicare’s standards [would] not go unnoticed”) (alteration 
and quotation marks omitted). 
 188 1994 WL 675720 (DDC). 
 189 Id at *5. The court apparently assumed without discussion that even after the 
Medicare Act amendments of 1987, the exact same notice-and-comment requirements ap-
plied under the Medicare Act as under the APA. Puzzlingly, the court did not even mention 
the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment provision. 
 190 Id at *4–5. 
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The second express application of American Hospital Associ-
ation in the Medicare context pre–Allina I seems dubious, but it 
may be useful to illustrate the outer limits of the substantive-
value-judgment test in that context. Clarian Health West, LLC v 
Burwell191 (Clarian I), was the district court precursor to Clar-
ian II, and thus involved the same facts.192 Concerned that hospi-
tals were abusing opportunities for “outlier” reimbursement (for 
unusually costly patients), CMS adopted a manual provision giv-
ing new guidance as to when contractors processing requests 
should apply an existing “reconciliation” formula designed to re-
duce unnecessary outlier payments.193 The district court was not 
convinced that the Medicare statute borrowed the APA’s proce-
dural rule exemption, but it offered an alternative holding applying 
the substantive-value-judgment test to support its later-reversed 
conclusion that notice and comment was required.194 The court 
concluded that the new guidance as to when to resort to reconcil-
iation “unquestionably ‘encode[d] a substantive value judgment’ 
about the hospital’s charges and cost reporting for Medicare re-
imbursements and ‘put a stamp of . . . disapproval’ on the hospi-
tals that are singled out by the rule.”195 The DC Circuit reversed 
in Clarian II without analyzing the district court’s alternative 
holding under the substantive-value-judgment test.196 Regard-
less, the district court’s rationale under that test seems to be in-
consistent with the reasoning of American Hospital Association 
insofar as the reconciliation provisions did not change the stand-
ard of review for outlier payments, but merely the frequency with 
which contractors would apply that standard to all providers in 
the first instance—the very sort of change to a generally applicable 
enforcement policy at issue in American Hospital Association.197 
Like Air Transport in another context, the district court’s 
decision in Clarian I arguably stretched the substantive-value-
judgment test to its breaking point. Given its contrary conclusion 
 
 191 206 F Supp 3d 393 (DDC 2016). 
 192 See notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 193 Clarian I, 206 F Supp 3d at 397–403. 
 194 Id at 414, 417. 
 195 Id at 417 (alteration omitted), quoting American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 196 See 878 F3d at 359. 
 197 See American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1051 (“This is not a case in which 
HHS has urged its reviewing agents to utilize a different standard of review in specified 
medical areas; rather, it asks only that they examine a greater share of operations in given 
medical areas.”). 
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on facts strikingly similar to those of American Hospital Associa-
tion, Clarian I is probably not indicative of the notice-and-com-
ment standard to which a court adopting the reconciled proce-
dural reading would hold CMS. In other words, Sierra-Nevada 
would likely be the rule, and Clarian I the exception. 
2. Applying the substantive-value-judgment test to the 
Allina line of cases. 
A court applying the substantive-value-judgment test would 
likely reach the same result in most cases as the courts that have 
already followed the dictionary approach to the Medicare stat-
ute. There is, however, room for difference at the margins. The 
substantive-value-judgment test’s overall consonance with the 
results reached in the DC Circuit’s only two binding cases on the 
Medicare Act’s procedural rule exemption, as well as the test’s 
subtle differences from the dictionary approach, are both points 
in favor of the reconciled procedural reading for reasons discussed 
later.198 
a) Allina, Clarian, and Polanksy: a different route to the same 
result.  The substantive-value-judgment test would have com-
pelled the same result in Allina. Recall in that case that CMS had 
decided to start including often-wealthier Medicare Part C bene-
ficiaries in calculations to determine reimbursement to hospitals 
for treating a “disproportionate share” of low-income patients.199 
It would be difficult to argue that this decision did not “encode[ ] 
a substantive value judgment.”200 If the substantive-value-judgment 
test spans a continuum from American Hospital Association to 
Reeder—in which the FCC had adopted new classes of radio sta-
tions and categorically barred existing station owners from apply-
ing for them201—the facts of Allina fall squarely on the Reeder side 
of the line. Changing the actual values plugged into a reimburse-
ment formula is more akin to applying “a different standard of 
review” than to changing the frequency with which the standard 
is applied,202 and it is “quite obvious that the rule[ ] changed the 
substantive criteria for” reimbursement.203 Adopting the recon-
ciled procedural reading would therefore be consistent with the 
 
 198 See Part IV. 
 199 See Allina I, 863 F3d at 938–40. 
 200 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 201 See notes 176–78 and accompanying text. 
 202 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1051. 
 203 Reeder, 865 F2d at 1305. 
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judgment in Allina II—the only decision interpreting § 1395hh(a)(2) 
that is nationally binding. 
While the district court in Clarian I concluded in the alterna-
tive that the rule in that case would be classified as a substantive 
rather than procedural rule under the substantive-value-judgment 
test,204 as noted above, this conclusion seems dubious. 205 The facts 
of Clarian I are remarkably similar to those of American Hospital 
Association, with CMS enforcing existing standards more aggres-
sively to catch what already would have been considered exces-
sive reimbursement.206 While the DC Circuit did not discuss the 
APA’s procedural rule exemption on appeal, it seems likely that 
most courts applying the agency-friendly substantive-value-
judgment test would find that the rule fell under the procedural 
rule exemption and did not require notice and comment.207 The 
DC Circuit could thus adopt the reconciled procedural reading 
and clarify that the substantive-value-judgment test applies in 
Medicare cases without overturning any of its own precedent. 
The reconciled procedural reading would likewise leave un-
disturbed the outcome of Polansky, in which the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania endorsed the dictionary approach. That case in-
volved a False Claims Act action in which the defendant was ac-
cused of falsely billing what should have been outpatient services 
as inpatient services to take advantage of a higher reimburse-
ment rate.208 The Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment provision 
came into play because HCFA had issued a manual provision 
stating that providers should bill stays shorter than 24 hours as 
outpatient and those longer than 24 hours as inpatient.209 The 
court concluded that “the 24-hour policy must be included within 
the District of Columbia Circuit’s definition for substantive legal 
 
 204 Clarian I, 206 F Supp 3d at 417. 
 205 See Part III.B.1. 
 206 Compare Clarian I, 206 F Supp 3d at 397–403, with American Hospital Associa-
tion, 848 F2d at 1041–44. 
 207 Compare Clarian II, 878 F3d at 355–56 (“The instructions merely set forth an en-
forcement policy that determines when [contractors] will report hospitals for reconcilia-
tion. They do not change the legal standards that govern the hospitals, and they do not 
change the legal standards that govern the agency.”), with American Hospital Association, 
834 F2d at 1050 (“The requirements set forth in the transmittal are classic procedural 
rules, exempt under that distinctive prong of § 553. The bulk of the regulations in the 
transmittal set forth an enforcement plan for HHS’s agents in monitoring the quality of 
and necessity for various operations.”) (emphasis in original). 
 208 Polansky, 422 F Supp 3d at 918. 
 209 Id at 932–33. 
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standard,” reasoning that “[j]ust as the respective policies in Al-
lina [I] and Select Specialty [Hospital] were ‘substantive legal 
standards’ under the Circuit’s definition because they determined 
entitlement to reimbursement, [ ] the 24-hour policy delineates 
the circumstances in which a hospital is entitled to higher inpa-
tient reimbursement.”210 Here again the test announced in Amer-
ican Hospital Association would likely yield the same result, as 
the manual provision almost certainly “encode[d] a substantive 
value judgment”211 as to which hospital stays were long enough to 
warrant “higher inpatient reimbursement.”212 
b) Select Specialty Hospital: potential differences.  The cases 
analyzed thus far do not demonstrate much of the difference be-
tween the DC Circuit’s current approach to § 1395hh(a)(2) and 
the substantive-value-judgment test. This is so because the clas-
sification of the rule in each of those cases is relatively clear al-
most irrespective of where one draws the line between substan-
tive and procedural rules. Select Specialty Hospital presents a 
closer case. The plaintiff hospitals in that case were challenging 
a rule requiring providers to bill state Medicaid and obtain docu-
ments known as “remittance advices” in order to receive reim-
bursement for the bad debts of patients eligible for both Medicare 
and Medicaid.213 Crucially, none of the state Medicaid offices the 
plaintiffs attempted to bill would issue remittance advices to pro-
viders not enrolled in Medicaid. None of the plaintiffs were en-
rolled in Medicaid, and many states barred their type of hospital 
from enrolling by law.214 There is little question that the court 
reached the right result under the dictionary approach articu-
lated in Allina I, as the rule in effect “create[d], define[d], and 
regulate[d] the rights, duties, and powers of parties”215 by requir-
ing the providers to participate in Medicaid or disqualifying them 
from reimbursement if they were unable to. 
A court applying the American Hospital Association test for 
procedural rules, however, might have reached a different result. 
 
 210 Id at 935. 
 211 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 212 Polansky, 422 F Supp 3d at 935. 
 213 Select Specialty Hospital, 391 F Supp 3d at 58–60. See notes 89–92 and accompa-
nying text. 
 214 Select Specialty Hospital, 391 F Supp at 60–61. 
 215 Allina I, 863 F3d at 943, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (West 10th ed 2014). 
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Leaving aside the providers that were unable to enroll in Medi-
caid,216 CMS had indicated that state Medicaid offices were re-
quired to allow providers that did not wish to participate fully in 
Medicaid to enroll for the limited purposes of obtaining remit-
tance advices.217 In the Government’s view, it was not CMS’s fault 
that providers were unable to obtain these documents, but the 
fault of noncompliant state Medicaid officials.218 The distinction 
between limited and full Medicaid participation was irrelevant 
under the dictionary approach, which focuses on the effect a rule 
has on reimbursement.219 But if the court had also been bound to 
consider whether the rule “encode[d] a substantive value judg-
ment,”220 it might have concluded that for the providers who were 
able to enroll, limited enrollment was a mere compliance cost 
more comparable to the informational requirements in JEM 
Broadcasting221 than to the categorical exclusion of substitution 
applications in Reeder.222 Within the meaning of the APA’s proce-
dural rule exemption, the rule in Select Specialty Hospital in at 
least some applications might have been considered “procedural 
despite [its] sometimes harsh effects.”223 This subtle difference 
demonstrates how the DC Circuit’s more nuanced approach to 
procedural rules under the APA could afford CMS greater discre-
tion at the margins to organize reimbursement procedures with-
out the constant burden of notice and comment.224 
 
 216 Application of the remittance advices requirement to these providers would almost 
certainly be considered a substantive rule under the substantive-value-judgment test, 
since they were excluded from receiving reimbursement for dual-eligible bad debts no mat-
ter what steps they attempted to take to comply. See Reeder, 865 F2d at 1305 (“[I]t is quite 
obvious that the rules changed the substantive criteria for substitution and permanently 
foreclosed the petitioners from pursuing their upgrade plans.”). 
 217 Select Specialty Hospital, 391 F Supp 3d at 69–70. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 221 See JEM Broadcasting, 22 F3d at 322. See also notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 222 See Reeder, 865 F2d at 1301. 
 223 Public Citizen, 276 F3d at 640. 
 224 Note that even if CMS had greater flexibility to issue rules without notice and 
comment, judicial review of agency discretion would still provide an important check on 
rules that seem downright irrational. For example, the plaintiff hospitals in Select Spe-
cialty Hospital also argued that requiring them to submit a document they were actually 
unable to obtain was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA, see 5 USC 
§ 706(2)(A), an argument which the court gave serious consideration in earlier, pre–Allina I 
stages of the same litigation, see Cove Associates Joint Venture v Sebelius, 848 F Supp 2d 
13, 28 (DDC 2012) (“If, at some point, Plaintiffs can establish that they have submitted 
the correct forms and made the right applications, it may . . . be arbitrary and capricious 
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IV.  ASSESSING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE RECONCILED 
PROCEDURAL READING 
Having explained how both the dictionary approach and the 
reconciled procedural reading work in practice, I turn now to their 
comparative merits. This Part proceeds in two sections. The first 
Section assesses the extent to which the reconciled procedural 
reading addresses the policy concerns Justice Breyer raised in his 
Allina II dissent and argues that its success on this front provides 
a strong policy rationale for adopting the reading. The second an-
ticipates and addresses counterarguments, concluding that while 
the reconciled procedural reading is not the only plausible inter-
pretation of § 1395hh(a)(2), it is at least preferable to the DC Cir-
cuit’s current reliance on the dictionary approach. 
A. The Reconciled Procedural Reading Addresses Some of 
Justice Breyer’s Concerns 
Justice Breyer laid out the most salient policy concerns re-
garding the boundaries of the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment 
requirement in his Allina II dissent, providing a useful metric by 
which to measure the advantages and disadvantages of the rec-
onciled procedural reading. Justice Breyer’s basic apprehension 
was that administration of the Medicare system would become 
impracticable.225 This Section compares the reconciled procedural 
reading and the dictionary approach along the lines of two more 
specific concerns underlying this fear: (1) that CMS lacks suffi-
cient guidance to regulate its own processes without fear of liti-
gation,226 and (2) that courts will simply begin to require notice 
and comment in more instances than feasible.227 
 
for the Secretary to not accept an alternative form of documentation or to require that the 
states comply with her regulations.”). 
 225 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1822 (Breyer dissenting) (“To imagine that Congress 
wanted the agency to use those procedures in respect to a large percentage of its Medicare 
guidance manuals is to believe that Congress intended to enact what could become a major 
roadblock to the implementation of the Medicare program.”). 
 226 See id at 1824 (“Nor does the Court’s resolution of this particular case offer clarity 
as to the scope of the statute.”). 
 227 See id at 1823: 
Is it reasonable to believe that Congress intended to impose notice-and-comment 
requirements upon all, or most, or even many of these rules, requirements, or 
statements of policy? . . . In my view, the answer is clearly no. Yet the Court’s 
opinion might impose this unnecessary and potentially severe burden on the ad-
ministration of the Medicare scheme. 
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As to the first concern, neither approach is a paragon of clar-
ity, but the reconciled procedural reading and the substantive-
value-judgment test that comes with it have a clear advantage 
over the dictionary approach. In evaluating a test for clarity, at 
least two factors seem relevant: the amount of available prece-
dent and the test’s determinacy. There is no contest with respect 
to the amount of precedent. If courts adopted the reconciled pro-
cedural reading, CMS could look to a body of precedent spanning 
several decades in determining which arguably procedural rules 
it must subject to notice and comment.228 By contrast, if the DC 
Circuit stays its course, CMS will still only have two binding prec-
edents to look to in its most important jurisdiction: Allina I and 
Clarian II.229 Of course, the DC Circuit is likely to build more 
precedent over time regardless. But if Justice Breyer was right 
about the sheer number of rules whose procedural validity is now 
up for grabs, the years it could take to build a meaningful body of 
case law will come at a critical time when CMS needs certainty 
more than ever. 
Determinacy is a tougher question. Scholars have criticized 
the substantive-value-judgment test as too malleable in applica-
tion, though that criticism to some extent centers on the vacated 
and partially repudiated Air Transport case.230 Still, the diction-
ary approach to § 1395hh(a)(2) remains largely untested and 
could suffer from its framing as a minimum. Moreover, a commit-
ment to dictionary definitions itself invites an endless and inde-
terminate search for a “clear” meaning, divorced from the context 
of the statute’s enactment or practical operation.231 Without any 
 
 228 See Part III.A. 
 229 See Part I.B.3. To be sure, Select Specialty Hospital is persuasive precedent in the 
DDC—likely very persuasive given that it is the only case in that district applying the 
dictionary approach in final disposition on the merits post–Allina II. But it has no binding 
force in any court and thus provides only tenuous guidance to CMS in deciding whether to 
put a rule through notice and comment. 
 230 See, for example, Jeffrey S. Lubbers and Nancy G. Miller, The APA Procedural 
Rule Exemption: Looking for a Way to Clear the Air, 6 Admin L J Am U 481, 486–90 (1992) 
(explaining the substantive-value-judgment test and attacking its brisk discussion in 
Reeder and excessively functionalist application in Air Transport). Professor Jeffrey Lub-
bers and Nancy Miller wrote this article one year after the DC Circuit vacated Air 
Transport, but two years before it partially disavowed the reasoning of that case. See JEM 
Broadcasting, 22 F3d at 328. 
 231 See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 71, 72 (1993) (“[C]iting to dictionaries creates [an 
illusion of certainty]. . . . Words in the definition are defined by more words, as are those 
words. The trail may be endless; sometimes, it is circular. Using a dictionary definition 
simply pushes the problem back.”). 
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express statement from a higher court fixing the upper bounds of 
what a “substantive legal standard”232 includes, district courts 
presumably remain free to expand the definition of that phrase.233 
Thus, CMS could be left playing appellate whack-a-mole as courts 
compete to further define the agency’s notice-and-comment obli-
gations. A certain amount of this game is, of course, inherent in 
the common law process, but there is little policy sense in starting 
this process from scratch with respect to procedural rules under 
the Medicare Act when an earlier process in the APA context has 
already produced an acceptable alternative. 
As to Justice Breyer’s second concern of subjecting too many 
rules to notice and comment, the reconciled procedural reading 
again seems to have an advantage, though perhaps only at the 
margins. The substantive-value-judgment test was designed to 
subject fewer rules to notice and comment than its predecessor, 
the substantial-impact test. The DC Circuit explained its move 
away from the substantial-impact test toward the substantive-
value-judgment test as “reflect[ing] a candid recognition that 
even unambiguously procedural measures affect parties to some 
degree.”234 The American Hospital Association court was sensitive 
to the internal flexibility agencies need to function effectively, em-
phasizing that “[t]he distinctive purpose of” the APA’s procedural 
rule exemption “is to ensure ‘that agencies retain latitude in or-
ganizing their internal operations.’”235 While the dictionary ap-
proach does not seem as aggressive as the substantial-impact test 
in its few applications so far,236 it does not share in such strong 
terms American Hospital Association’s preference for agency flex-
ibility. And the dictionary approach could prove more malleable 
than the substantive-value-judgment test—indeed, given its 
framing as a minimum, the dictionary approach seems even more 
 
 232 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 233 In this sense, the DC Circuit may have set itself up for a repeat of the events 
leading up to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Corp v Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc, 435 US 519 (1978), in which the Supreme Court issued a harsh rebuke of the 
lower courts’ imposition on agencies of procedural requirements beyond those expressly 
contemplated by the APA. Id at 524–25. Some credit Vermont Yankee with bringing about 
the near demise of the demanding substantial-impact test, which even the DC Circuit had 
previously applied. See, for example, Taylor, Note, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 129–36 (cited in 
note 50). 
 234 American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1047. 
 235 Id, quoting Batterton v Marshall, 648 F2d 694, 707 (DC Cir 1980). 
 236 See Clarian II, 878 F3d at 354–56 (concluding that CMS’s guidance concerning 
application of the reconciliation formula did not establish or change a “substantive legal 
standard” even though in effect it cost the plaintiff hospitals millions of dollars). 
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susceptible to an Air Transport–like attempt to stretch the notice-
and-comment requirement to its absolute limit, frustrating CMS’s 
efforts to efficiently administer the country’s second-largest public 
benefits program. While such an attempt has not yet material-
ized, as the discussion of Select Specialty Hospital above sug-
gests,237 adoption of the reconciled procedural reading could cabin 
the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment requirement to afford 
CMS needed flexibility in close cases. 
B. Addressing Counterarguments 
While I contend that the reconciled procedural reading is 
preferable to the DC Circuit’s current dictionary approach to 
§ 1395hh(a)(2), neither my reading nor the test that comes with 
it is perfect. A few potential counterarguments bear addressing. 
The first two question the reconciled procedural reading’s validity 
as a matter of statutory interpretation. The third questions the 
substantive-value-judgment test’s judicial administrability. Each 
of these counterarguments raises important concerns, but I main-
tain that the reconciled procedural reading is sound as a matter 
of both statutory interpretation and policy. 
1. Returning to Allina II’s meaningful-variation argument. 
First, one might argue that a reading of § 1395hh(a)(2) as 
borrowing the APA’s procedural rule exemption fails to give 
meaningful variation to the unique text of the Medicare statute 
as required by Allina II. After all, the majority in that case de-
voted a substantial portion of its opinion to highlighting the tex-
tual differences between the two statutes and explaining why 
those differences commanded a different interpretation.238 The ar-
gument would be that there is an insufficient basis in the text of 
the Medicare Act to conclude that Congress intended to borrow 
the APA’s procedural rule exemption, which the Medicare statute 
does not expressly mention. 
But the meaningful-variation argument carries less force 
with respect to the APA’s procedural rule exemption than with 
respect to its interpretive rule exemption. The Government’s ar-
gument in Allina II relied on the premise that “substantive” was 
 
 237 See Part III.B.2. 
 238 See Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1812–14. 
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a term of art in notice-and-comment law that connoted the oppo-
site of “interpretive.”239 Casting “substantive” as the opposite of 
“procedural” does not require the extra step of a term of art—the 
words are ordinarily used as antonyms.240 The only semantic leap to 
be made here is from the implied antonym “procedural legal stand-
ard” to “rule[ ] of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”241 
To be sure, this leap is not a foregone conclusion given some 
of the Court’s language in Allina II. In particular, the Court noted 
that while “the phrase ‘substantive rule’ . . . was a term of art in 
administrative law” prior to the Medicare Act amendments, Con-
gress instead “introduced a seemingly new phrase to the statute 
books when it spoke of ‘substantive legal standards.’”242 But as 
difficult as this passage may seem for the reconciled procedural 
reading, some of the language in American Hospital Association, 
which the statute’s drafters likely had in mind, suggests an un-
derstanding of “rule[ ] of agency organization, procedure, or prac-
tice”243 as a rule that does not alter a substantive legal standard.244 
With American Hospital Association in mind then, the reconciled 
procedural reading is still defensible against the meaningful-
variation argument.245 
Moreover, rather than simply asking why Congress would 
seek to accomplish the same result with different language, one 
might just as well turn the question on its head: Why would Con-
gress have chosen such a minor variation in language if it intended 
to subject Medicare rules to a meaningfully different notice-and-
comment standard? Given that “substantive” is naturally read as 
the opposite of “procedural” (not “interpretive”), why attach so 
much significance to the choice of the word “standard” over “rule”? 
To do so, I think, gives far too much credit to a conference com-
mittee making eleventh-hour changes to a 473-page spending 
 
 239 See id at 1818 (Breyer dissenting). 
 240 See note 162 and accompanying text. 
 241 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 242 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1813 (emphasis in original). 
 243 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 244 See notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
 245 It is true that the Court in Allina II described the potential reference to American 
Hospital Association in the conference committee report as “oblique.” See Allina II, 139 S 
Ct at 1815. But as I argue above, a deeper dive into court decisions that were actually 
recent at the time of the conference report, as well as the timing of the report’s release, 
makes it hard to see the report as referencing any other case. See notes 142–47 and ac-
companying text. Any court willing to consider legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion should take the likely reference to American Hospital Association and its implications 
regarding procedural rules seriously. 
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bill.246 Attempting to divine what was going through the commit-
tee lawyers’ heads when they chose the word “standard” might be 
an interesting intellectual exercise, but it seems in poor taste to 
indulge in this exercise any further than necessary if it leaves the 
insurer of over sixty million Americans guessing at how it is to 
administer its program. At any rate, meaningful variation is not 
the only canon of statutory interpretation, and it need not end the 
inquiry when the legislative history militates in favor of the rec-
onciled procedural reading.247 
2. The limits of purposivism. 
Second, it is not obvious that the only policy preference Con-
gress could have expressed in choosing the language “substantive 
legal standard”248 was one in favor of the agency’s internal flexibil-
ity. After all, the entire impetus for codifying a notice-and-comment 
requirement was that HCFA was not taking its notice-and-comment 
obligations seriously enough.249 But to the extent that courts are 
willing to consider legislative history, the conference committee’s 
decision to change the words “significant effect”250 to “substantive 
legal standard”251 must reflect some degree of sensitivity to the 
need for flexibility. The conference committee’s stated rationale 
for the change was “to clarify that only policies establishing or 
changing a substantive legal standard governing benefits, pay-
ment, or eligibility must be promulgated as regulations.”252 It 
would seem to follow that the point of changing the language was 
to subject fewer rules to notice and comment than the earlier draft 
of the subsection would have. It is hard to imagine an argument 
for limiting the scope of the notice-and-comment provision that 
does not include some concern for CMS’s ability to administer the 
Medicare system. So while the reconciled procedural reading is 
not the only plausible reading from a purposivist standpoint, it is 
surely at least one plausible reading. 
 
 246 See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, 101 Stat 1330-55. 
 247 See Part II.B. 
 248 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 249 See notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 250 See HR 3545 at 30019 (cited in note 130). 
 251 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 252 HR Conf Rep No 100-495 at 566 (cited in note 132) (emphasis added). 
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3. The substantive-value-judgment test’s indeterminacy. 
Finally, one might argue that the DC Circuit’s test for proce-
dural rules under the APA presents too indeterminate a stand-
ard. The argument would be that courts applying the substantive-
value-judgment test in the APA context have produced unpredict-
able results, making it difficult for agencies to determine which 
rules at the margins between substance and procedure they 
should subject to notice and comment. Adopting the reconciled 
procedural reading would thus lead only to more uncertainty in 
the world of Medicare and usher in a state of affairs little better 
than the “smog” surrounding the legislative/interpretive divide in 
the APA context.253 
I do not contend that the substantive-value-judgment test is 
a perfectly determinate solution, nor will I spill any ink debating 
the relative merits of standards and bright-line rules in the law. 
I will only reply that this solution is preferable to the DC Circuit’s 
continued reliance on the dictionary approach. The Allina I court 
conducted a brisk analysis under a “minimum” definition without 
articulating a maximum as to what the statute might require.254 
The reconciled procedural reading would at least tie down inter-
pretation of the statute to a body of existing cases that would help 
outline the contours of the notice-and-comment requirement.255 
Furthermore, CMS only recently lost access to the important in-
terpretive rule exemption. A certain degree of flexibility in the 
applicable test may be desirable so that courts can weigh the im-
plications of their decisions on the continued administrability of 
the Medicare system and avoid completely blindsiding CMS, as a 
bright-line rule might require. Though the reconciled procedural 
reading cannot extinguish the fire the Allina decisions started, it 
can at least contain the flames. 
CONCLUSION 
Allina II may not have provided much clarity, but it did leave 
room to refine the DC Circuit’s nascent interpretation of the Med-
icare statute. Treating § 1395hh(a)(2) as the mirror image of the 
 
 253 See note 28 and accompanying text. 
 254 Allina I, 863 F3d at 943. 
 255 See Part IV.A. 
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APA’s exemption to notice and comment for “rules of agency or-
ganization, procedure, or practice”256 is perhaps not the only plau-
sible reading of the statute, but it is one of the most natural, and 
it comes with “the added virtues of clarity and stability.”257 Best 
of all, having committed to its dictionary definition only as a “min-
imum” and never having fixed the limits of the notice-and-comment 
provision’s coverage,258 the DC Circuit could adopt the reconciled 
procedural reading and cabin the Medicare Act’s notice-and-
comment requirement without overturning any prior precedent. 
With the health insurance of over sixty million Americans on the 
line, providing a clearer statement of CMS’s notice-and-comment 
obligations is a necessary “procedure.” 
 
 256 5 USC § 553(b)(A). 
 257 Allina II, 139 S Ct at 1823 (Breyer dissenting). 
 258 Allina I, 863 F3d at 943. 
